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This overview is  organized around two main themes.  The first  is  a version
of the  induced innovation model.  It considers  the  impact of land and
water quantity as well as  quality on the  international competitiveness of
U.S.  agriculture.  The  second is  a derived demand analysis,  focusing upon
how export demand for U.S. agricultural output  is  linked to  the  demand for
agricultural inputs.
The overall perspective of the paper is  that the growing "openness" of
U.S.  agriculture has caused agricultural trade  to become increasingly
linked to both the  quantity and quality of domestic agricultural  inputs
employed, and to  the market (and shadow) prices for  these  inputs.
Critical inputs  include land, water, fertilizer, and the labor/capital
mix, each of which directly affects environmental quality.
When agricultural export demand is  strong in an open, trade-dependent
economy, demand also increases for  these  inputs.  This  intensifies
agricultural production and often stimulates concern about soil erosion
and water quality.  Restrictions on the use of  these inputs on behalf of
environmental  quality can raise  the private costs  of production, creating
differential costs  in countries with strong as opposed to weak
environmental regulations.  On the other hand, when export demand is  weak,
declining input demand puts downward pressure on profits in the  input
supply sector.  This  stimulates efforts to  reduce  inventories not  only of
surplus output but also of surplus  inputs  in production, notably land.  In
2these  circumstances, a key issue concerns which lands are to be  retired,
because  if productive  lands  are  removed while unproductive  lands remain in
crops, competitiveness  is further reduced.  There is  evidence that  the
structure of current commodity programs, as well  as  specific
environmentally targeted efforts, such as  the  Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP),  are not encouraging crop production to shift onto our most
productive, least erodible acres.
Because U.S. and European environmental regulations have strong domestic
constituencies,  it  is unlikely that the environmental regulatory climate
will be substantially weakened in  the name of agricultural
competitiveness,  even if export demand and farm prices remain depressed.
Therefore,  future agricultural policy should explicitly link environmental
policies  directed at land and water use  and quality to objectives of
export competitiveness.  This will require, among other things, targeting
land retirement policies by land category.  If successful,  this  effort can
improve both agricultural productivity and environmental quality, and will
promote true comparative advantage,  rather than the environmental
equivalent of  "beggar-thy-neighbor"  trade policies.
OPENNESS AND INSTABILITY  IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
In recent research, we uncovered an apparent puzzle:  while instability of
international prices has  remained essentially constant from year to year
during the  1970's and 1980's,  instability in U.S.  farm prices and incomes
has  increased substantially (Houck, 1986, Myers and Runge, 1985).  This
runs counter to  the view that instability has  increased in the
3international marketplace, leading, in turn, to  increases  in domestic
price and income  instability.
International price trends  for wheat, corn and soybeans over  the period
from 1965/66 to  1984/85  show no significant upward trend in price
instability for any of these commodities, no matter how one  treats  the
aberrant price fluctuations  of the early 1970's.  Average percentage  price
changes have been substantial, but these year-to-year changes do not seem
to be  significantly greater  (or less)  at  the end of this period than at
the beginning.  Over the  entire 20 year period, yearly price changes  in
wheat averaged 9.4 percent;  in corn (maize) 10.5 percent;  and in soybeans
13.9 percent.  Appendix 1 shows yearly data together with trend charts and
an analysis of variance  for situations  including and excluding the
aberrant price movements of 1972/74.  Regardless of whether those years
are  treated as  outliers or not, no significant upward trend in price
variability is  revealed.
This year  to year variation provides a slightly different perspective than
comparisons made over longer time periods.  In a recent analysis,  for
example, Sutton  (1987) compared the percentage change  in  export wheat
price variability over the entire period 1960-72 with the entire period
1973-84, using the  coefficient of variation around the period average
(mean) or CVM, as a basis.  Export prices for both periods were calculated
as  free-on-board  (f.o.b.)  for Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the United
States.  These were expressed in own currencies with the exception of
Argentina, which was expressed in U.S. dollars.  Sutton found that  the CVM
4measure doubled in all  four countries,  increasing by an average  of from
13.3  to  25.7 percent.
This finding is not  inconsistent with the findings of Houck, however.
Since Houck measured percentage changes  from year to year, rather than
over 10-12 year periods,  it is possible for a step  increase  to occur in
the period mean variation from 1960-72 to  1973-84 while year  to year
changes reveal an insignificant trend.  By reducing variations  over the
two periods to  single-valued averages,  information is  lost that may be
reflected in yearly calculations.
At the  same time, United States farm price and income instability has
increased substantially.  In wheat, farm price instability increased by
107.9 percent as measured by the coefficient of variation around trend
(CVT) in nominal terms and by 159.1 percent  in real terms from the  1960's
(1962-1971) to  the  1970's and early 1980's  (1971-83).  In corn, farm price
instability increased 176.6 percent  in nominal terms  and 262.5 percent in
real  terms over the  same period.  In soybeans,  the nominal  increase was
152.2 percent and the  real increase 164.0 percent  (Myers and Runge,
1984a,b,  1985).  All  of these increases,  calculated for domestic  farm
prices and income according to  Piggot's  (1978) method, are highly
statistically significant. They contrast with the statistically
insignificant year to year changes  in international price instability.
These findings are consistent with Sutton's  (1987) cross-county
comparisons.  Sutton found substantial increases  in the variability of
5wheat prices received by United States producers.  Using a CVM measure, he
reports variation in U.S.  prices  increasing from 1960-72  to  1973-84  from
7.2 percent to  27.4 percent in  real  terms,  or by a total  of 280.5 percent.
This compares with 42.2  percent in Argentina, 57.8 percent in Australia,
65.4 percent in Canada, and 35.6  percent in  France.  Using the  CVM measure
as well as  the number of reversals  in wheat price direction, Sutton
concludes:  "Both variability measures  strongly  suggest that U.S.
producers were subject  to a greater rise  in price variability than
producers in any other country."  Despite  the  different approaches  taken
by Houck, Myers and Runge, and Sutton to measure  international price
instability, all  find unambiguously that domestic U.S.  price variation has
increased substantially more that  international price variation from the
1960's  to  the  1970's and 1980's.
When the sources  of United States  domestic  instability were divided into
supply and demand side components, clear shifts  in each market  in the
direction of increased demand side  instability were found over time.
These  shifts were  relatively insensitive  to demand elasticity assumptions,
ranging from  -0.3  to  -1.1  (Myers and Runge,  1985,  pp.  73-74).  It  is
inescapable that most of the United States  demand shifts  during the 1970's
and 1980's originated from the  export rather  than the  domestic  component
of demand.  Moreover, supply interruptions,  such as  those  caused by
weather, are  of lesser  importance as  a cause of  instability in this period
than popularly assumed  (Myers and Runge, 1985,  p. 76).
6One plausible interpretation is  that instability in the  international
marketplace has increased less  than in the United States marketplace due
to  the changing structure of the U.S. farm economy and U.S. agricultural
policy.  Increased "openness" resulting from increased agricultural  trade
dependence can cause a greater proportion of international market
instability to be reflected in domestic  farm prices and  incomes  (Schuh,
1983).  This interpretation  is supported by the  increased proportions  of
U.S.  wheat, corn and soybeans traded internationally.  From 1962-1971, an
average of 49.5 percent of U.S. wheat, 13.0 percent of U.S. corn and 31.1
percent of U.S. soybeans flowed into  international trade.  By  1971-1983,
this proportion had increased to  58.4 percent for wheat, 27.0 percent for
corn, and 39.4  percent for soybeans.  In addition, adjustments  in U.S.
farm commodity programs have permitted U.S.  farm prices to  reflect world
market conditions more fully in recent years.  Additional specialization
in export crop production occurred in U.S. agriculture, further
strengthening the link between international markets and the  domestic farm
economy.  The land area planted to wheat, corn, and soybeans increased  54%
between 1970 and 1981.  Furthermore, the proportion of total U.S.  farm
production value accounted for by these  three export crops  increased from
16%  to 24%  in the same period, a 50%  expansion.
The  increased openness of U.S. agriculture to  international  instability,
especially to  fluctuations  in demand, has had both positive and negative
effects.  It benefited U.S.  farmers as world demand strengthened relative
to supply in the  1970's because the United States  is a large  contributor
to  total world grain exports.  However, as weak demand and oversupply
7developed in the 1980's,  falling purchases of U.S.  grains were directly
reflected in decreased U.S.  farm prices and incomes.
In addition, this openness has  affected the demand for  farm inputs derived
from production of grain crops,  including land, water, fertilizer, and the
capital/labor mix. It  is  the  derived demand for these  inputs  in an open
trading environment  that explains  the linkage  from international trade to
environmental quality. In order  to explore  these  linkages in greater
detail, we use  the  induced innovation model.
INDUCED INNOVATION, FACTOR ABUNDANCE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Induced innovation in agriculture  includes  the  impacts  of technology on
environmental quality.  The induced innovation hypothesis  (Hayami and
Ruttan, 1985) may be extended by arguing that  agricultural technology
change often affects the quality of factors  of production such as
groundwater or soil fertility  (Runge, 1986).  Irrigation technology, for
example, may affect groundwater  quality once  adopted.  A  central problem
is  the private market's inability  to reflect the  scarcity value of these
environmental quality characteristics.  These missing markets may also be
complicated by concerns about equity and distribution  (Runge and Myers,
1985).  In either case, there  is  an incentive to  innovate nonmarket
institutions  (including regulations)  which more accurately reflect the
implicit values  of land or water quality.  Institutional  innovations
affecting factor use  in agriculture  thus evolve  in response  to  the
environmental impacts  of technological choice.  In this paper,  these
issues will be explored using groundwater  regulation as  a case  in point.
8An important stimulus  to  the  evolution of regulations affecting water
quality is that environmental amenities are  a bundle of characteristics
which is more highly valued as  incomes  increase  (Ruttan, 1971).  This
means that in high income countries, institutional  innovations,  such as
the United States Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, will probably occur.
They will then impinge on factor prices  and, thus,  on technical choice  in
agriculture.  In poor countries such innovations are not  likely to  occur.
The tendency of high income  nations  to attach more value  to environmental
quality, and less to  agricultural production, has domestic and
international policy implications.
Consider a three-stage model of technological choice  in agriculture.  The
first  two stages  involve,  (1) the choice of technology and,  (2) the  impact
of this choice on the quality of factors,  groundwater  in this
illustration.  The third stage occurs as  changing water quality induces
institutional changes which in turn affect the choice  of agricultural
technology.
Let there be  two  types of activity.  The  first  is  agricultural production
using land, water and energy to produce food;  the second is  consumption.
There are  two classes  of agents:  farmers and consumers.  Some  agents
(farmers)  are both producers  and consumers.  Consumers demand food
produced by farmers.  They also  consider the quality  of land and water a
distinctly superior  consumption good.  Farmers and consumers may both
consider water quality as  a consumption good, but farmers  also consider  it
9a factor of production.  Producer-consumer externalities  resulting from
this  interdependence will be considered below.
In the  first stage,  relative factor  scarcity determines technical choices
for producers.  As a typical illustration, consider the case of irrigation
and its  impact on groundwater.  In Figure 1, land, water and energy are
factor  inputs;  00 and DD represent the relative abundance  (and implicit
value) of land and water in two particular times and places;  the dotted
curves  IPCO and IPC1 represent innovation possibilities curves;  and
isoquants Io and I1 represent particular agricultural production
technologies chosen in situations 0 and 1 respectively.  The straight line
[W,E]  represents a fixed complementarity between water and energy.  IPCO
represents  the technological possibilities associated with relatively
abundant land and relatively scarce water, such as dryland cropping prior
to  irrigation pumping.  The particular technology in use, Io,  is  one in a
set of possible techniques  lying inside  the envelope of IPCO.  Io  is  a
cost-minimizing technology when it  is  tangent to 00 at point X.  With the
relative factor abundance prevailing at 00, Lo, W0,  and EO are  implied
levels of land, water and energy used by the  dryland cropping technology
IO.
Now suppose that water becomes more abundant relative  to land, due to
increased underground water extraction, as  from the Ogallala Aquifer of
the High Plains  or from the Central  Sands region of Wisconsin during the
1960s and 1970s  (Kneese, 1986;  MacKenzie,  1983).  This change  is  reflected
in the new price line, DD.  The change from 00  to DD,  if correctly
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INDUCED  TECHNOLOGICAL  INNOVATION
11perceived, stimulates research by agricultural engineers  and others  into
new irrigation technologies, such as  center-pivot irrigation, that  are
water and energy using.  This innovation process  leads to  an inward shift
in the innovation possibilities curve from IPCO  to  IPC1,  implying
efficiency  improvements.  Within these new innovation possibilities,  the
particular technology chosen  (center-pivot irrigation)  is  Il,  at  point Y,
with L1, W1 and E1 representing the levels of land, water and energy used.
The relative  scarcity of land, water, and energy explain research into
technologies such as  center-pivot irrigation.  In the Central Sand
Counties  of Wisconsin, for example, unreliable rainfall, low water-holding
capacity of the  soil, high commodity prices, and abundant underground
water encouraged research during the 1950s  and 1960s  into the  application
and adoption of center-pivots.  In 1974 irrigated acreage in these
counties was  10 times higher than in 1945, while from 1974 to  1977
irrigation with center-pivot technology increased nationally by only 61.9
percent  (Sloggett, 1979).
A second-stage  effect of the center-pivot was on water quality for non-
agricultural purposes.  In Wisconsin, the coarse-grained sandy soils of
the Central Sand Counties hold less than one  inch of water per  foot, and
are quite permeable where groundwater  is near the surface.  While the
quantitative abundance of water encouraged irrigated crop production, the
soil  characteristics contributed to  the leaching of nitrate  into
groundwater  sources  (Griffin and Bromley, 1981).  This leaching
contaminated some local water supplies,  reducing water quality even though
12water quantity was unaffected.  Although this example  is  specific, the
phenomenon is  general:  technical choices  in agriculture affect the  quality
of the physical environment.  As Saliba (1985)  observes,  the quality and
quantity of groundwater are not separable.  This makes appraisal of
specific water quality characteristics crucial  to  evaluating alternative
agricultural production techniques.
If consumers demand different quality levels  than producers,  the  impact of
agricultural technology on environmental quality may eventually affect  the
technology chosen by farmers themselves.  This recursive  effect, leading
from consumers'  demand for water quality back to producers' choice of
technique, can be market driven if consumers' environmental quality
demands are reflected in market prices.  However, the market mechanism
often fails.  Such "missing market" phenomena create an incentive to
develop nonmarket signaling mechanisms, such as  environmental regulations.
Consider the following plausible sequence.  Extensive  irrigation leads  to
nitrate pollution of groundwater.  Despite continued abundance of water as
an agricultural  input, declining water quality affects  some consumers'
health.  If consumers' value water quality highly and are willing to  pay
for  it  at prices  in excess  of those reflected in the market, this
disequilibrium creates  incentives for institutional innovation such as
taxes,  subsidies, or regulations  to restrict groundwater  or fertilizer use
by farmers.  These measures  raise  the relative factor price of water used
in production and cause a fall  in  its use.  If enacted, these measures
reduce farmers'  incentives to continue water-intensive irrigation even if
13some downward pressure on land prices occurs  in the longer run.  New
research is  stimulated into  less water-intensive irrigation techniques,
inducing a new round of water conserving technological  innovations  like
drip-irrigation.
This third stage  in the induced innovation process can be  triggered even
if markets for environmental quality characteristics are missing. It  can
profoundly affect subsequent choices  of agricultural  technique.
Regulations  impose costs on producers, altering implicit factor values and
inducing  subsequent changes  in agricultural technology.  The range of
possible institutional innovations  is  large and need not include
government regulation.  The relative costs  and perceived equity of various
institutional alternatives affecting water quality may lead to
arrangements such as  local water users associations or quasi-market
options  (Anderson, et.al.,  1983).  Thus, changes  in the relative scarcity
of factors and changes  in environmental quality cause technology and
institutions  to evolve  together.
Ruttan (1971) has  tied the evolution of public concern over environmental
quality directly to income, arguing that a high quality environment is
more highly valued as  incomes  increase.  He argues:
[I]n relatively high-income economies, the  income elasticity of
demand for commodities and services related to sustenance  is  low and
declines  as  income continues  to rise, while the  income elasticity of
demand for more effective  disposal of residuals and for environmental
amenities  is high and continues to  rise.  This  is  in sharp contrast  to
the situation in poor countries where  the  income elasticity of demand
is high for sustenance and low for environmental amenities  (pp. 707-
708).
14If environmental quality has  a high income elasticity and food
(sustenance) has a low income elasticity,  two  important implications
follow.  Engel's Law that the  demand for  food falls  relative to  other
goods  as  income increases  implies  that food producers may have less  claim
on social rents  than producers of other goods and services as  incomes
rise.  In contrast,  if  the demand for environmental quality rises strongly
with higher incomes, societal resources may be shifted toward the supply
of environmental quality and the technologies which promote it.  The
interplay of Ruttan's argument and Engel's Law helps explain recent trends
in the environmental regulation of agriculture, including groundwater.
Ruttan predicts that  if environmental quality is not achieved by markets,
then higher income  countries will have greater reason than poor ones  to
correct this through environmental regulation.
This suggests, first,  that debates  over environmental quality
characteristics, and remedies for missing markets, will be most intense  in
high income circles.  Second, these  debates can be expected to  revolve
around the political desirability of different strategies  to protect
environmental quality.  Some may favor market or quasi-market solutions;
others may prefer regulation.  But among high income groups, environmental
quality is increasingly a consensus objective.  Correspondingly, debate
over environmental quality is  likely to  occur primarily within high income
countries such as Canada, Western Europe  and the United States.  Low
income countries will show less  interest in the environment  than in
expanded food output.
15From an international perspective, the  technological innovations of the
1970s,  which responded to  increased world food demands, occurred instead
of the domestic adjustments which Engel's Law would have dictated had U.S.
farmers been producing solely for domestic markets.  Yet  as agricultural
output  (and technology) responded to  the  export market boom, Ruttan's
principle was  also operating,  creating increasing demands  for
environmental quality. The perception that market forces  in  agriculture
failed to account adequately for environmental quality created support for
institutional innovations  to  regulate agricultural use of herbicides,
pesticides,  groundwater, and cultivation practices.  These  innovations
generally conflict with the maximum output goals  embodied in the  "fence
row to  fence row" dictum.
Environmental quality considerations entered the 1985  Food Security Act in
the form of conservation compliance, strict  sodbuster language, and  the
acreage retirement provisions  of  the Conservation Reserve Program.  Such
institutional innovations were  largely the work of environmental interest
groups with new and significant interests  in  agriculture.  Although
difficult to measure,  it appears  that as  these  groups gained influence,
the general  farm organizations' overall  strength continued to  decline.
While considerable disagreement remains  over  agricultural policies,  there
is a surprisingly strong consensus about  environmental quality as  a policy
objective.  Evidence of willingness  to  pay for  improvements  in
environmental quality through higher taxes  is  strongly  indicated by
surveys conducted by Resources for  the Future  (1980) and others.
16In lower  income countries, however,  the demand for increases  in
environmental quality seems  to  take second place  to  the  demand for
increases  in agricultural output.  This  is  typified by several major
agricultural export competitors,  such  as Argentina and Brazil.  Like  the
United States  in  its own early period of economic  growth and expansion,
lower  income countries  are  likely to  impose few environmental regulations
on their agricultural  sectors.  One result  is  that  the herbicides  and
pesticides outlawed in North America and Western Europe  are  readily
marketed in the  Southern Hemisphere.  (Even so,  consumers are  increasingly
demanding regulatory protection for foreign-grown foods  that may be
tainted by chemicals outlawed in  the United States.)  These trends are
detrimental both for environmental quality in  the  Third World and  for
competing U.S.  farmers, who bear  the additional costs  that higher  incomes
bring as production technology adjusts  to  stricter environmental
regulations.
In summary,  the  induced innovation model provides  insight  into the  choice
of agricultural technology, the  impact of this  choice  on environmental
quality, and the consequent restrictions  imposed on agricultural inputs.
When interpreted in light of the  differential income  effects  on
environmental quality versus food,  this  process  is  likely to  create
stronger regulatory regimes  in rich rather  than poor economies.  The
comparative value  attached to  environmental quality by individual
societies may have direct  effects on agriculture cost structures and
international competitiveness.
17THE DERIVED DEMAND FOR AGRICULTURAL INPUTS:
LINKAGES TO ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Having considered the  impact of choices of agricultural technique  on
environmental quality, we turn now to  the impact of external forces  on the
valuation of factor inputs in an open trading environment.  While export
market shifts have been discussed broadly  in terms of stresses  on
agricultural  inputs,  a more explicit analytical  framework is helpful.
This  is offered by the concept of derived demand.
The producer's  input demands are derived from the  demand for the  final
commodity produced.  This well-known relationship implies  that as
agricultural  output prices change relative  to  input prices  in response to
changes in world markets, profit-maximizing producers will respond by
altering land, water, fertilizer, and labor/capital applications.  This  is
because  input demand functions are directly related to output price
levels.  Higher relative output prices  lead to  increases  in input demands
at all input prices and vice versa.  Hence,  increases  (decreases)  in
output demand, if translated to output price  increases  (decreases) will
lead to more  (less)  inputs demanded at all input prices.
The derived demand relationship, when paired with the induced innovation
hypothesis, provides a basis for examining both upswings and downswings  in
exports  and the resulting impacts on input values.  However, because
environmental  constraints affect agricultural factor prices differently in
high versus  low income countries, and because land is  immobile within
countries,  the relevance of the  factor price equalization theorem central
to much of international trade  theory is  diminished (see Leamer,  1984).
18In the first  stage of the induced innovation model, relative  factor
abundance determines the choice  of technique.  Differential factor
abundance determines  the  international distribution of production in
neoclassical trade  theory as well.  Mutually beneficial trade  arises
because basic production conditions differ from country to  country.  In
empirical analysis, Hayami and Ruttan (1985)  show that the historical
development of agricultural technologies  in Japan and the United States
reflect the relative abundance of labor in Japan, and land in the United
States.  In a recent econometric survey, Learer  (1984) finds  that land
area together with literate labor are  the  two major factor inputs
associated with exports of cereals and textile fibers worldwide.  The
United States  is  by far the major exporter of these products, and the
statistical analysis  identifies land as  a "clear contributor to
comparative advantage  in cereals"  (Leamer,  p. 257).  Overall, Learer
argues that adequate explanations  can be derived  for comparative  advantage
in the crops and raw materials, but large question marks surround that  for
manufactured commodities  (p.  115).
Hence, there  is relatively strong historical and econometric  evidence to
indicate that agricultural sectors develop technology which  is  biased in
favor of abundant factors.  Since U.S.  agriculture is  a sector with
increasing exposure to  international  trade over time, we expect that  the
demand for heavily traded agricultural commodities  (notably wheat, corn
and soybeans)  is reflected in the  demand for and prices of abundant
inputs,  notably land.
19In recent research, we have examined the statistical relationship between
land values and export demand.  Preliminary results support the  derived
demand linkage.  Based on previous work by Melichar (1979);  Burt  (1986);
and Alston (1986),  we argue that  land values  are a function of current and
expected net farm income.  Developing this  relationship in greater depth,
we argue that net farm income may be decomposed into non-random components
associated with domestic and export market demand, government payments,
farm costs,  real rates  of interest, and some purely random fluctuations.
The particular role of export markets as  a source of expected increases in
net farm income  should then play an important role in the determination of
farmland prices.  When changes  in land values are plotted against changes
in the value of major export crops,  a striking correlation is revealed.
The possibility that this  correlation is spurious  or due  to other causal
variables cannot be rejected.  However, we believe  that market-driven
returns affect farmland prices and not  the reverse  (Phipps, 1982).  Since
export market demand has been a major source  of expected increases  in
these returns,  exports should predict changes  in land values  in highly
export-dependent states such as Minnesota, as  suggested by Figure 2.
The relationship, of course,  is  related in part to  agricultural  trade
policies.  When target prices and income deficiency payments were
introduced by the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973,  the
policy regime of the United States changed to  the  form under which it has
largely continued to  operate.  In essence, the United States  accumulates
inventories  in periods of excess  supply and reduces them in periods of
20excess  demand.  As "stock manager to  the world,"  it  therefore absorbs  a
disproportionate share of world price instability  (Sutton, 1987).  As  its
dependence on world trade in agriculture has grown, it would be natural to
expect this openness  to be transmitted to  input prices and quantities.
Hence, we maintain that the market for land in an open, trade-dependent
agricultural sector will be directly affected by export demand.  If this
hypothesis holds true  for other inputs, then the derived demand
relationship can be used to  explain the  impact of exports on input markets
and the agricultural  sector as  a whole.
We divide  the discussion of these  impacts  into two parts,  corresponding to
the  "upswing" in agricultural exports  during the  1970's,  and the
"downswing" during the 1980's.  This impact  is not likely to be
symmetrical,  since overall "openness" appears to have increased during the
same period, suggesting that the  "downswing" may have affected input
demand more profoundly than the  "upswing".
In the  1970's,  increasing U.S. exports  of wheat, corn, and soybeans were
accompanied by increasing land values.  When land values increase,  the
return required to justify the purchase of this  input must also rise,
creating incentives for more intensive land use.  This intensity
characterized land use, as  well as  the use of water, fertilizer,  and
chemicals. Concern arose over the  extent to which the United States was
exporting its  topsoil and engaging in a non-reversable exploitation of
basic productive resources.  Also questioned was  the degree to which
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chemicals, could be justified in pursuit of greater exports  (see Batie and
Healy, 1980).
As noted, these market driven trends also corresponded to  the growth of an
environmental movement, largely outside of agriculture, which viewed them
with increasing alarm.  Environmental legislation was passed partly to
protect against the shifting of external costs  of intensive production to
the public  at large  (Batie, et al. 1986).  This legislation, despite
recent attempts  to weaken or veto  it  (e.g. the Clean Water Act),  is
strongly supported by the Congress  and public. These measures  are
increasingly likely to  impinge on agriculture over time.
In the  1980's, we have seen a reversal  of growth in U.S. exports.  The
familiar statistics describing this decline  are underscored by even more
dramatic declines  in land prices.  These have fallen by over  50 percent in
the most export-dependent regions  of the nation including the  Corn Belt
and the Great Plains.  As  land values have fallen with weak export
markets, the incentive to  farm the land intensively also has been reduced.
This has  caused declines in the demand for a variety of agricultural
inputs,  including fertilizer,  chemicals, seed, and farm equipment.
Inventories  of these non-land inputs have been cleared by bankruptcy,
business consolidations, and falling prices.
Domestic consumption of all fertilizer  in the  1986/87 year  is projected to
be down 20 percent from its peak in 1980/81.  Farm machinery expenditures
23have fallen from a peak of $10 billion in 1981 to  an estimated of $4.5
billion in 1987, a 55 percent drop  (Kiplinger,  1987).  Land inventories
have been absorbed at huge losses by commercial banks,  the Farm Credit
System, and the federal government through the  Conservation Reserve
Program and the Acreage Reduction Program (ARP) of the Food Security Act
of 1985.  If this  argument is  accurate,  then, as  long as  export demand
remains weak, input inventories  in U.S. agriculture will continue  to
accumulate or to  fall  in price through the derived demand linkages
described above.
Meanwhile,  the differential restraints  imposed by environmental
legislation in both the United States  and (to an even greater degree)
Europe will attach higher implicit costs  to scarce natural resources over
time.  These restraints  imply higher operating costs  for U.S. and European
producers than for  their competitors in countries with fewer environmental
restrictions.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND POLICY RESEARCH
Taken together, the  induced innovation model and derived demand linkages
suggest that:  (1) environmental regulation is  a binding constraint
affecting agriculture  in developed Western economies, but not  in less-
developed countries;  (2) in an open, trade-dependent economy, upswings and
downswings  in the demand for export crops will be  linked to corresponding
increases and decreases in demand for land, water, fertilizer, chemicals,
24and farm machinery.  The differential cost structure  implied by  (1)  poses
a problem of competitiveness  for U.S. producers.  The  instability in
prices  and incomes implied by  (2)  suggests a need for policies capable of
responding to fluctuations in world demand without  imposing either
unnecessary environmental costs during demand peaks or unnecessary
liquidations and retirement of  inputs during demand weakness.
At  the most general level,  these problems  suggest  that environmental
regulations in agriculture should be a key focus of policy research and
analysis, not only because of immediate concerns  for environmental
quality, but also because they will affect international competitiveness.
Hence, natural resource economists and trade policy analysts will be
forced to develop a more common set of understandings and approaches to
policy analysis.  Secondly, the attempt to  improve general trade
competitiveness and to manipulate U.S.  agricultural trade policy through
commodity programs and inventory adjustments,  must acknowledge
environmental constraints  in both economic  and political terms.
The commodities policy of the United States  is now highly uncoordinated
with environmental policies affecting agriculture, even within the 1985
Food Security Act.  To  illustrate the need for policy research, this
section considers the problem of targeting land eligible for agricultural
price support and set  aside programs with the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP) of the 1985 Act.  While specific to  this particular Act,  the problem
is  representative of the need to  integrate environmental and agricultural
policy analysis  and research.
25The CRP is  increasingly seen as  competing with the  supply control,  or  "set
aside,"  provisions of  the  1985  Farm Bill.  Both programs  attempt to  remove
acres  from production, but are  in  effect bidding against one another to
remove many of the same  acres  (Taff and Runge,  1986).  This has  led to
calls  for  increased targeting of program coverage.  Consider  the
importance  of a new round of innovations  in agricultural policy focused on
targeting land according  to demonstrated productivity and environmental
sensitivity.  Such a land-targeting scheme would be based on  the principle
that  environmental policy constraints cannot be  satisfied unless
production is  moved away from environmentally sensitive  lands.  At the
same  time, competitiveness cannot be assured unless  production is  moved on
to high productivity lands with comparatively lower input requirements.
These changes would satisfy  the environmental quality constraint while
actually improving the comparative advantage  of U.S. producers  by lowering
input costs.
At the  same  time,  instability resulting  from increased openness  to world
markets need not  lead to a desire  to  close  our export markets nor to
support  for wholesale acreage retirement  schemes  (see Rogers,  1985).
Rather, we should seek  to  buffer our agricultural sector  from wide  swings
in world demand.  Here a land targeting scheme also has an  important role
to play.  If production of  intensively grown surplus  grains  on low-
productivity/environmentally  sensitive lands  is  eliminated by targeting
the  10-year Conservation Reserve Program  (CRP) specifically to  these
lands,  then the cost of the  CRP would  fall, because  lower bids  are
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27necessary.  Also, the  competition between the  CRP  and the Acreage
Reduction Program (ARP) of the  1985  Farm Act would be  eliminated.  If
higher-productivity/environmentally  sensitive  lands were  then slated for
3-5 year retirements through  some  form of paid diversion similar  to  the
ARP, remaining export crop production could be concentrated on those lands
that are highly productive but not environmentally sensitive  (see the
Economic Report of the  President, Chapter 5).  The comparative advantage
of U.S.  agriculture  is  greatest on these  lands.  They are  the  last lands
that should be retired from production on both environmental and
competitiveness grounds.  One year set-asides could, if necessary, then be
devoted to  the high-productivity/low sensitivity lands  in periods of
excess  supply.  However, they should not be eligible  for  10-year or  3-5
year retirement.  The combined effect of such  targeting would be  to retain
the most productive  lands in  cultivation, reduce  input costs,  and retain a
high level of potential production and export  competitiveness.  This will
lead to greater overall demand in  the  input supply sector.  A schematic
diagram of such a targeting program is  shown in Figure  3.
Contrast this approach with current programs.  Now, high productivity
acres  are intentionally being retired under the  CRP at higher than cash-
rent bids, plus additional  "sweeteners"  to make the  CRP competitive with
ARPs and deficiency payments.  Moreover, as abundant, high-productivity
land is  reduced in quantity, incentives are created to  substitute  capital
and machinery, further exacerbating the  negative environmental  quality
effects described above.  The recently announced CRP  "bonus" payments  for
28corn base  acres, for  example, are not only expensive, but a threat  to U.S.
competitiveness since  they will retire many internationally competitive
acres  that  should remain in production.  At  the  same time,  the  continued
eligibility of low-productivity/environmentally  sensitive lands  for  1-year
ARPs means  than environmental policy objectives  are unmet while  supply
control objectives  are continually subverted because of "slippage."
Slippage occurs when farmers rationally  "set aside"  acreage  in  low-
productivity areas, many of which are  also environmentally sensitive.
Rather than focusing on maximum production efficiency  in an  international
context, these policies  encourage producers to  "farm the programs"  to  the
detriment of environmentally sound resource allocation.
Land targeting schemes also can provide a constructive, piecemeal approach
to  supply control,  in contrast  to  stringent proposals  to  retire  large
productive areas.  Policies for coordinated conservation set-asides are an
especially appealing basis for bilateral negotiations with the European
Community.  In this arena, recent gains by environmentalist political
groups make supply reduction for environmental quality good politics.
29CONCLUSION
The U.S. agricultural sector is and likely will remain highly dependent
on  international trade.  It will also be  increasingly constrained by
environmental regulations.  These realities dictate the development of a
common language and research agenda for environmental and agricultural
trade policy interests.  This can lead to programs  in which competitive,
low-cost lands are brought under  intensive cultivation, while the most
environmentally sensitive  are retired.  Only by developing such a common
agenda can programs be structured that link international trade to
resource conservation.
The policy research agenda defined by this overview is rather
straightforward.  First, careful attention should be given to  the
interface between environmental regulation and agriculture, both
domestically and internationally.  Second, more precise estimates of
derived demand linkages  from export markets to  input demands  are needed if
the domestic  effects of trade are  to be better understood.  Third,  the
data available for land targeting schemes need to be applied to actual
policies.  These issues define a research agenda for  the  1990's which
promises greater environmental benefits and  improved competitiveness in
the next century.
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33APPENDIX  A
34Table Al  International  Prices and Price Changes  for Wheat,  Corn, and
Soybeans, Marketing Years 1965-66  to  1984-85.
Wheat-  Cornh  Sovbeansc
Year  Priced  % Changee  Priced  % Changee  Priced  % Changee
1965/66  1.59  - 1.43  - 2.97
1966/67  1.80  13.2  1.45  1.4  3.20  7.7
1967/68  1.68  -6.7  1.21  -16.6  2.84  -11.3
1968/69  1.71  1.8  1.30  7.4  2.69  -5.3
1969/70  1.45  -15.2  1.56  20.0  2.34  -13.0
1970/71  1.64  13.1  1.34  -14.1  2.97  26.9
1971/72  1.64  0.0  2.17  61.9*  3.19  7.4
1972/73  2.48  51.2*  3.12  43.8*  5.31  66.5*
1973/74  4.82  94.4*  3.34  7.1  6.65  25.2
1974/75  4.45  -7.7  3.02  -9.6  6.31  -5.1
1975/76  4.13  -7.2  2.87  -5.0  5.46  -13.5
1976/77  3.08  -25.4  2.41  -16.0  7.33  34.2
1977/78  3.16  2.6  2.57  6.6  6.57  -10.4
1978/79  3.83  21.2  2.92  13.6  7.48  13.9
1979/80  4.74  23.8  3.20  9.6  6.93  -7.4
1980/81  4.95  4.1  3.20  0.0  7.87  13.6
1981/82  4.65  -6.1  3.33  4.1  6.40  -18.7
1982/83  4.32  -7.1  2.79  -16.2  6.55  2.3
1983/84  4.19  -3.0  3.45  23.7  7.64  16.6
1984/85  4.13  -1.4  3.20  -7.2  6.30  -17.5
a #2 Hard Red Winter, F.O.B. Gulf
b #2 Yellow, F.O.B. Gulf
c #2 Yellow, C.I.F. Rotterdam
d U.S. Dollars
e From Previous Year
*Outlier, Dropped in Regression Series #1, included in Regression Series #2
Sources:  International Wheat Council, World Wheat Statistics;  F.A.O.
Production Yearbook;  USDA Foreign Agricultural  Services, Oilseed Circulars.
35Table A2  Regression Series # 1
Trend for Soybeans
19  Observations
OLS  - Dependent Variable is  PCSYPI  ( % Change  in Price  from Previous Year)
COEFFICIENT  STANDARD ERROR  T-STATISTIC
CONSTANT  9.8228070  4.1768222  2.351742
TRENDS  0.3335088  0.3663315  0.9104015
R-squared  0.046488  Mean of dependent var  13.15789
Adj.  R-squared  -0.009601  S.D. of dependent var  8.70436 S.E. of regression  8.746046  Sum of squared resid  1300.386
Durbin-Watson stat  2.392273  F-statistic  0.828831
Trend for Corn
18 Observations
OLS  - Dependent Variable is  PCCRPI  ( % Change  in Price from Previous Year)
COEFFICIENT  STANDARD ERROR  T-STATISTIC
CONSTANT  7.5627451  3.4216669  2.2102517
TRENDC  0.2460268  0.3161081  0.7782996
R-squared  0.036478  Mean of dependent var  9.900000
Adj.  R-squared  -0.023742  S.D. of dependent var  6.876815
S.E. of regression  6.957970  Sum of squared resid  774.6136 Durbin-Watson stat  1.863311  F-statistic  0.605750
Trend for Wheat
18 Observations
OLS  - Dependent Variable  is  PCWHPI  ( % Change  in Price from Previous Year)
COEFFICIENT  STANDARD ERROR  T-STATISTIC
CONSTANT  8.7862744  4.0800604  2.1534668
TRENDW  0.0102167  0.3769333  0.0271048
R-squared  .00004591  Mean of dependent var  8.883333
Adj.  R-squared  -0.062451  S.D. of dependent var  8.049278
S.E.  of regression  8.296816  Sum of squared resid  1101.394
Durbin-Watson stat  2.051048  F-statistic  0.000735
36Table A3  Regression Series # 2
Trend for  Soybeans
20  Observations
OLS  - Dependent Variable  is  PCSYPI  ( % Change  in Price  from Previous Year)
COEFFICIENT  STANDARD ERROR  T-STATISTIC
CONSTANT  14.60526  6.974785  2.094009
TRENDS  0.1161654  0.582243  0.1995134
R-squared  0.002206  Mean of dependent var  15.825
Adj.  R-squared  -0.053226  S.D. of dependent var  14.6305
S.E.  of regression  15.014666  Sum of  squared resid  4057.9237
Durbin-Watson stat  1.971057  F-statistic  0.039806
Trend for Corn
20 Observations
OLS  - Dependent Variable  is PCCRPI  ( % Change in Price from Previous Year)
COEFFICIENT  STANDARD ERROR  T-STATISTIC
CONSTANT  16.52789  7.142466  2.314032
TRENDC  -0.2221805  0.5962415  -0.3726350
R-squared  0.00765521  Mean of dependent var  14.195
Adj.  R-squared  -0.04747505  S.D.  of dependent var  15.02316
S.E.  of regression  15.375634  Sum of squared resid  4255.3823
Durbin-Watson stat  1.25966056  F-statistic  0.138857
Trend for Wheat
20  Observations
OLS  - Dependent Variable  is PCWHPI  ( % Change in Price  from Previous Year)
COEFFICIENT  STANDARD ERROR  T-STATISTIC
CONSTANT  18.50789  10.57320  1.7509740
TRENDW  -0.3078947  0.8826337  -0.3488364
R-squared  .00681918  Mean of dependent var  15.260
Adj.  R-squared  -0.0483581  S.D.  of dependent var  22.23651
S.E.  of regression  22.767820  Sum of squared resid  9330.7271
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.5239820  F-statistic  0.123582
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